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ABSTRACT 
The notion of Umwelt (e.g. von Uexküll 1936/2001; 1937/2001) has gained currency in the domain of 
robotics. Do robots have an Umwelt? Are robots to be conceived of as subjects that truly experience 
their perceiving and acting upon the world? Or are they merely artificially signaling or behaving as if 
they do? 
Initially, it may have seemed that work in robotics, also known as nouvelle AI, has better chances of 
dealing constructively with the question of subjective experience than traditional AI because of the 
embodied embeddedness of its systems. This embodied embeddedness, properly self-organized and 
dynamically coupled, might be enough to ground the flow of information to such an extent that genu-
ine feeling, volition and intentionality would arise.  
However, it has been argued (in two recent papers on von Uexküll; Ziemke & Sharkey 2001; Em-
meche 2001) that embodied embeddedness, though important, is not sufficient for establishing the 
presence of an Umwelt. Systems, it is claimed, need to be alive in order to be able to have an Umwelt. 
Autopoiesis, the self-producing and self-maintaining property of cells, is characteristic of living sys-
tems and is considered to be indispensable in order for a system to have an Umwelt.  
I will argue that the relation, that is claimed to exist, between being alive and having an Umwelt is not 
obvious and in need of considerable clarification. Moreover, I will suggest that the focus on autopoi-
esis, interpreted as a sharpening of constraints on the matter of implementations can be seen not as in 
opposition to, but rather as a consequence of the aims of nouvelle AI and its views on the function, 
form and matter of robotic systems.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the history of Artificial Intelligence (AI)1, proud programmers that created a 
program that did something interestingly cognitive have been asked the question; but 
does it know what it is doing? Does it know that it is doing something? Turing (1950) 
discussed this question under the heading ‘the argument from consciousness’, and attri-
buted it to Professor Jefferson who spoke about the importance of doing something be-
cause of thoughts and emotions felt, and not merely artificially signaled. Recently, it 
seems that this ‘perennial problem’ of AI has come to plague the nouvelle AI (situated 
robotics or autonomous agents research) through the notion of Umwelt (von Uexküll 
1936/2001; 1937/2001). Are robots to be conceived of as subjects that truly experience 
their perceiving and acting upon the world? Or are they merely artificially signaling or 
behaving as if they do? 
At least sometimes some robots seem to move around with a purpose, they seem to 
avoid difficulties and they seem to be capable of sustaining themselves, avoiding damage 
and energy depletion. They seem to know about their environment and they seem capable 
of learning more. Some of their reactions to events seem to be based on their history of 
interactions with the environment. The question is: Is all this mere seeming? 
Of course, much is in the eye of the beholder. We, human beings, have a strong ten-
dency to attribute the possession of purpose or volition, thought and beliefs and desires, 
and even feelings to many things (including, at times, cars and refrigerators) that upon 
consideration would not qualify as genuinely possessing these capacities. In the case of 
robots the danger of over-interpretation is present even more strongly (Braitenberg, 1984 
gives some amusing examples). This human tendency to over-interpretation may provide 
the same wind in the sails of scientists working within nouvelle AI as it did for those 
working within Good Old Fashioned AI (think of Eliza or MYCIN). The potential for 
commercial exploitation of this tendency is already investigated by companies that build 
’household pet-robots’ (e.g. Sony’s Aibo and SDR-4X). 
However, the risk for overinterpretation seems to me to be no greater than the risk for 
‘underinterpretation’. For instance, it would serve no useful purpose to exclude, from the 
outset, the possibility that robots might have the capacity to have experiences. I find ar-
guments such as ‘only living creatures have feelings, purposes and beliefs, robots are not 
alive, hence they do not have these properties’ to be far from convincing, specifically 
because the first premise is not well established but rather an issue of empirical investiga-
tion. Of course, it may turn out to be true that robots do not have feelings or purposes and 
beliefs, precisely because they are not living organisms. It is just that I do not think it is 
valid to reason like this from the outset. 
                                                 
1 The label ‘AI’, in this context, includes what Haugeland calls Good Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence 
(GOFAI: the symbol-rules approach) and traditional forms of connectionism (e.g. the feedforward net-
works that were particularly popular in the 80s). This form of AI has to be distinguished from more recent 
work in robotics, that is sometimes addressed as Autonomous Agents Research. However, since the ques-
tion can and has been raised whether these autonomous agents are genuinely autonomous, I will use the 
phrase ‘nouvelle AI’ as a general label for recent work in robotics.  
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The central question I will be concerned with is whether robots have or can have an 
Umwelt. The notion of Umwelt was introduced in the work of von Uexküll (a.o. 
1936/2001; 1937/2001) and it designated the subjective experience of an organism of its 
perceptual and effector world. It focuses specifically on the phenomenal aspects of spe-
cific, perceptually and motorically selected parts of the environment (Emmeche 2001: 3).  
I think the notion of Umwelt is particularly relevant to nouvelle AI because it emphasizes 
the interaction of the ‘I am interacting with the world’ experience. That is, it stresses 
more than just the ‘I’, and allows for an approach to experience that does not focus exclu-
sively on the inner aspect of experience.  
I will argue that taking the notion of ‘life’  as a necessary condition for the existence 
of an experienced Umwelt does not help significantly in assessing the capacities of ro-
bots. I will suggest that taking a closer look at the way form, function and matter interact 
may be a more fruitful way to discuss the Umwelt of robots. 
 
2 THE PERENNIAL PROBLEM OF AI 
Throughout time, human beings have compared themselves to a great variety of ma-
chines. The value of such comparisons has been doubted from the start as well. Hippo-
crates (around 400 BC), for instance, said the following:  
 
“Comparing humans with their products is an expression of an extraordinary impoverished view 
on humanity.” (quoted in Simmen 1968: 7-8) 
 
In more recent times, the product with which humans were compared was the clock 
(cf. Draaisma, 1986). Hobbes (1588 - 1679) raised the question about exactly what prop-
erties to attribute to clocks and watches: 
“Seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within; why 
may we not say, that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a 
watch) have an artificial life" (quoted in Flew 1964: 115). 
Descartes (1596-1650) related this question specifically to the debate about animals: 
“I cannot share the opinion of Montaigne and others who attribute understanding or thought to 
animals. (..) I know that animals do many things better than we do, but this does not surprise me. 
It can even be used to prove they act naturally and mechanically, like a clock which tells the time 
better than our judgment does. Doubtless when the swallows come in spring, they operate like 
clocks" (Descartes, 23 November, 1646, letter to the Marquee of Newcastle; Kenny 1970: 206-
207). 
Based on the same comparison between clocks and organisms, Descartes opposed the 
suggestion of Hobbes. For Hobbes the self-moving quality of clocks led to the question 
about whether one could not attribute clocks the property of life, whereas for Descartes 
the similarity in certain aspects (most notably regularity) of the behavior of clocks and 
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animals provided sufficient reason to deny animals any form of understanding. De Male-
branche (1638-1715) denied that animals experienced anything: 
“Animals are without reason or consciousness in the usual sense. They eat without appetite, they 
scream without pain, they grow without understanding this, they don’t want anything, they don’t 
fear anything, they are not aware of anything”(quoted in de Wit 1982: 389). 
They way he continues is quite interesting in the current context: 
“If sometimes perhaps they behave in such a way that this seems reasonable, then this the conse-
quence of a bodily plan, that God ordered, that, on behalf of self-preservation, they without rea-
son, purely mechanically, escape everything that threatens to destroy them” (quoted in de Wit 
1982: 389). 
If one would replace the word ‘God’ with ‘human being’ and ‘animal’ with ‘comput-
er’ or ‘robot’ a statement results that can be found in the present day in relation to the 
computational models and robots of AI. Turing, as is well known, discussed the perennial 
problem of AI under the heading ‘the argument from consciousness’, and attributed it to 
Professor Jefferson:  
“No mechanism could feel (and not merely artificially signal, an easy contrivance) pleasure at its 
successes, grief when its valves fuse, be warmed by flattery, be made miserable by its mistakes, 
be charmed by sex, be angry or depressed when it cannot get what it wants.” (Turing 1950: 42). 
Basically, we have here the position of De Malebranche, applied to computers instead 
of to animals.  
The perennial problem has been raised in different forms, a.o. ‘they’ (whether clocks, 
computers, robots, or even animals) are not autonomous, they don’t know what their re-
presentations are about, they are not intentional systems, they are not capable of semiosis, 
they have no originality, they are not creative, they do not have emotions, they have no 
feelings, they are not conscious, they have no awareness, they are not alive. Something 
that can confuse the debate considerably is that with whatever question the debate may 
start, pretty soon one gets tangled up with some of the other questions. Yet, underlying all 
these questions is the same unifying doubt: is anyone there?2 [2] 
3 NOUVELLE AI 
Robots are interesting candidates about which to raise these questions. Several of their 
properties seem to make an outright negative answer difficult. First of all, robots are em-
bodied and embedded creatures. That is, they have a body (in contrast with the computa-
tional models of traditional AI) through which they interact with their environment (con-
sisting of objects and other (artificial and/or living) creatures, and their embeddedness in 
the world shapes their behavior and cognitive processes.  
                                                 
2 I am ignoring here issues like ‘how would we know whether robots have experiences or not?’ because the 
same question could be raised in relation to the experiences of other people than oneself (the well known 
‘other minds’ problem). 
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Moreover, much of the behavior of robots seems to be not predetermined but, on the 
contrary, emergent. Emergence, of course, is a rather murky concept, but in the current 
context the following aspects are relevant. First of all, emergence in the context of robots 
can be understood as unprogrammed functionality (Clark 2001: 114). The behavior of the 
robot is not directly controlled or programmed for in a straightforward way, but arises out 
of the interactions between a limited number of components that can be substantially dif-
ferent in their properties and action possibilities. Clark gives the example of simple beha-
vioral dispositions (tend towards the right, bounce back when touching something) in a 
robot that, under the right circumstances, could lead to emergent behavior such as wall 
following. 
Secondly, an important aspect of emergence is that the overall, or higher-level, pat-
tern shapes, influences or constrains the behavior and interactions of the lower-level 
components. This is sometimes referred to as ‘downward causation’. There have been 
many debates about how the notion of downward causation should be interpreted in order 
to make any sense (e.g. Kim 1993). I concur with the position of El-Hani & Emmeche 
(2000: 262) who claim that downward causality can be understood as a form of (Aristote-
lian) formal causality:  
“Higher level entities establish a particular pattern of constraints on the relations of the lower-
level entities composing them.”  
The downward causative force of a higher-level patterns can be viewed as restricting 
the possibilities for interaction among the lower-level components. Finally, the phenome-
non of causal spread can be observed in relation to robots. Causal spread is defined by 
Wheeler & Clark (1999: 106) as follows: 
“The phenomenon of interest turns out to depend, in unexpected ways, on causal factors external 
to the system.” 
Traditional AI focuses on what happens inside the system. Specifically the central 
nervous system (artificial or biological) is seen as holding the main causes for the beha-
vior. But according to Wheeler & Clark, the causes of my behavior are not to be found 
exclusively inside me but they are ‘spread out’ into the environment.  
In all, in order to understand the behavior of robots it is necessary to take into account 
diverse and varying aspects of their body and their environment and the way these as-
pects interact and self-organize. Thus, it is not unreasonable to investigate the possibility 
that robots may have an Umwelt.  
4 AUTONOMY, UMWELT AND LIFE 
In a recent paper, Ziemke & Sharkey (2001: 725-726, 730) examine the Umwelt and au-
tonomy (in the sense of being to a considerable extent independent of their human crea-
tors) of robots. Specifically, they focus on robots that evolve through genetic algorithms 
and that are controlled by recurrent networks. According to them, such robots adapt to 
their environment and have a historical basis of reaction. That is, the reactions of robots 
are subjective because they are self-organizing and not completely built in, and because 
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they are specific to the robots and their history of experience. Moreover, robots are in-
volved in sign processes and make use of the signs themselves, which provides them with 
a degree of epistemic autonomy. As Ziemke & Sharkey say, robots are ‘on their own’ 
while interacting with the environment. Third, the development or evolution of robot con-
trollers (i.e. the artificial neural networks) and sometimes even their bodies (in simula-
tion) follows, what von Uexküll called, ‘centrifugal’ principles. They develop from the 
inside out, contrary to the more standard centripetal principle of connecting prearranged 
parts (like a robot-arm or an optical censor) to a central unit, from the ‘outside in’. Final-
ly, robots can co-evolve with other evolving entities. Ziemke & Sharkey give a.o. the 
example of the work by Nolfi & Floreano (1998) where robots (kheperas) controlled by 
recurrent neural networks co-evolve with other robots into groups displaying either pre-
dator or prey behavior. Cliff & Miller (1996) provide an example of internal co-evolution 
where the controller and the optical sensor evolve in an intermingled fashion. 
In all then, one would think that there are good reasons to suspect that robots such as 
these qualify to a certain extent for having autonomy and an Umwelt. That is, one can 
give grounds for claiming that, in a rudimentary way, the robots do things on their own 
and need to have a higher-order mapping and evaluation of their sensory and motor sam-
ples of their environment. However, Ziemke & Sharkey end their paper with a clear ‘No’ 
to the question whether robots such as these have an Umwelt, specifically because these 
robots are not alive: 
“The components might be better integrated after having self-organized, they might even be con-
sidered ‘more autonomous’ for that reason, but they certainly do not become alive in that proc-
ess.” (Ziemke & Sharkey 2001: 736) 
The same verdict is given by Emmeche: 
“what gives the Umwelt its phenomenal character is not the functional-cybernetic aspect 
of signal-processing within the system (and at the system-environment interface), but the 
fact that the living organism is beforehand constituted as an active subject with some 
agency. Thus, only genuine living beings (organisms and especially animals) can be said 
to live experientially in an Umwelt.” (Emmeche 2001: 19). 
Thus, robots have no Umwelt because they are not alive to start with and they do not 
become alive in their increasingly autonomous interaction with the world. This argument, 
if sound, would disqualify artificial creatures with one stroke, and would necessitate ro-
botics to become a branch of biology in order to get any closer to producing creatures 
with an Umwelt. 
At this point, however, I would like to raise a question that may sound strange at first 
(at least it did to me when I first thought of it): What’s life got to do with it? First of all, 
‘life’ and ‘experience’ are not synonyms. The question whether there can be experience 
without life is an empirical one. Likewise, the question whether artificial creatures (to be 
distinguished from living creatures) can have an Umwelt is an empirical question. The 
whole point of research in robotics is to investigate the capacities and properties of ro-
bots. It might be a matter of discovery that, due to emergent effects of the couplings be-
tween control systems (brains), bodies and environments, the experiencing of an Umwelt 
may arise in certain kinds of creatures, living or artificial. This is not to say that there can 
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or will be no differences between artificial and living creatures, but just that the having of 
experiences need not be a difference. 
Secondly, there are situations where creatures can be said to be alive without having 
experiences. Deep dreamless sleep is normally considered to be experience-less, as are 
some forms of coma. Organisms without a nervous system are generally considered to be 
without experience (e.g. Damasio 1999; Emmeche 2001). Hence, being alive is not suffi-
cient for having experiences.  
More difficult, of course, is the other issue, regarding creatures having experience 
without being alive. The suggestion that a non-living creature may have experiences cer-
tainly does sound odd. There is a strong tendency to equate ‘non-living’ with ‘dead’, and 
‘being dead’ as a state of not (or no longer) experiencing anything. However, it seems 
that in relation to robots this tendency will not do. Basically, what I am suggesting here is 
that artificial creatures do not perfectly fit in either the ‘dead’ or the ‘alive’ category. 
Their experiential capacities can therefore not be decided upon by attempts to force them 
into one of these classes. 
So, is life a necessary condition for experience? Well, why would it be? What exactly 
are the arguments? There are, at least, two arguments to be examined. The first argument 
is that all experiencing creatures that we know are living creatures. A testimony to the 
tendency to associate life with experience is that reported after-death experiences are of-
ten referred to as ‘life after death’. In response one only has to point to the fallibility of 
induction. It may be the case that up till now all the creatures that can be said to have 
experiences are living creatures. But this does not constitute proof for the thesis that life 
is a necessary condition for experience. The unreliability of the inductive argument is all 
the more pressing because robotics is in the business of constructing creatures of an alto-
gether new (which is why we have reserved the specific word ‘robot’ to refer to them), 
artificial, non-biological kind. Exactly what properties apply to these creatures is not 
something that can be decided upon on the basis of past experiences. 
A more substantial argument is one that would explain why creatures that can have 
experiences must be alive. One such argument would be that the matter out of which liv-
ing creatures consist constitutes experience. I propose to look more closely at this issue. 
What properties of living matter would be essential to having experiences? 
5 FROM MATTER TO EXPERIENCE: AUTOPOIESIS  
I have not been able to find an argument that directly relates the capacity of having expe-
riences to specific properties of matter. One concept, however, that does get mentioned 
often as being essential to living matter is autopoiesis (e.g. Maturana & Varela 1987), 
referring to the self–generating and self–maintaining capacity of a.o. cells. So, the ques-
tion becomes: how is autopoiesis related to experience?  
Cells are considered to be prime examples of autopoietic systems. However, cells are 
not generally regarded as having experiences. Emmeche (2001: 18), for instance, indi-
cates that unicellular eukaryotic cells (protozoa) lack a nervous system and do not have a 
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genuine Umwelt. Thus, it seems that it is not autopoiesis that is constituting the capacity 
of having experience. Moreover, the notion of autopoiesis does not reflect some intrinsic 
quality of a specific kind of matter but indicates a characteristic of the organization of 
matter, hence it denotes a functional quality. As Maturana & Varela, (1987: 51; see also 
Ziemke & Sharkey 2001: 732) 
“the phenomena they generate in functioning as autopoietic unities depend on their organization 
and the way this organization comes about, and not on the physical nature of their components.”  
So, autopoiesis could be realized in other stuff. The fact that the particular material 
that composes living organisms on earth may be a matter of historical or evolutionary 
coincidence:  
“Autopoietic organization can be attained by many different types of components. We have to 
realize, however, that as regards the molecular origin of terrestrial living beings, only certain 
molecular species probably possessed the characteristics required for autopoietic unities, thus 
initiating the structural history to which we ourselves belong” (Maturana & Varela 1987: 49). 
If Umwelt, the subjective experience of the perceptual and motor interaction with the 
environment, turns out to depend on certain functional characteristics that are normally 
found in some forms of matter, why could these functional characteristics not be repli-
cated in other materials? Far from disqualifying robots, this argument leads us to consider 
more carefully the relation between the function, form and matter of artificial creatures. 
6 FUNCTION, FORM AND MATTER 
Traditionally, at the center of cognitive science is the idea that any system should be 
analyzed at three different levels. At the task level, the function of the system is ex-
amined, and hypotheses are formulated about what the system has to do. At the formal or 
computational level, the way in which this function is performed is studied. At this level, 
it is the form of the processes that is the topic of investigation. And finally, at the physi-
cal level, one considers the material composition of the system that is being analyzed. I 
will, at times, use the terms ‘function’, ‘form’ and ‘matter’ to refer to the three levels of 
analysis.  
From the perspective of traditional AI, the picture that emerges from considering the 
three levels of analysis is roughly the following. At the task level one considers what the 
function is that the (sub)system has to fulfill. The analysis at the task level results in a 
formulation of the main problem that the system has to solve through internal information 
processing. For instance, Marr (1982) famously stated that the task to be solved by the 
visual system was the transformation of a 2-dimensional retinal image into a 3-
dimensional world of recognized objects. At the organizational level, the focus is on the 
computational relations between representations.  
Algorithms specify the way in which problems can be solved. Different algorithms 
can be devised and compared in respect to their efficiency and/or psychological plausibil-
ity, etc. At the physical level, for traditional AI almost anything qualifies because algo-
rithms can be performed by a whole range of material constructions, from high tech com-
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puters to empty beer cans, as Searle has been fond to point out. The analyses at the task 
and formal level are such that not too much constraints on the physical level result. Any 
material substrate that could implement formal processes is, in principle, sufficient.  
For nouvelle AI, the situation is quite different. At the task level, the system is 
thought to be aimed at homeostasis, attempting to maintain its own organization while 
interacting with the environment. In relation to the form of the organization of the sys-
tem, the way its components interact, the attention is directed at the way the system self-
organizes, allowing a dynamic coupling between system and environment. The require-
ments of homeostasis and self-organization result in much stronger constraints on the 
matter in which these processes are to be achieved, resulting in the requirement for auto-
poietic units. The following matrix summarizes the differences between traditional and 
nouvelle AI: 
 
 Traditional AI Nouvelle AI 
Function (Task level) problem solving Homeostasis 
Form (Organizational level) algorithm self-organization 
Matter (Physical level) almost anything autopoietic units 
 
I suggest that nouvelle AI forces us to reconsider the answers provided by traditional 
cognitive science at the three levels of analysis. Robotics is important to cognitive 
science in part because the basic ideas presented by nouvelle AI at the three different 
levels result in much stronger constraints on the relations between the levels. This, in 
turn, leads to a more careful consideration of the material constitution of robots. Impor-
tantly, this does not just apply to the artificial nervous systems of robots, but more gener-
ally, to the material constitution of the robot as a whole.  
7 THE PROTO-UMWELT ARTIFICIAL CREATURES 
Let us, by way of conclusion, consider what would follow if robots would be devel-
oped according to the ideas indicated above. Imagine an artificial system that consists of 
autopoietic units that maintain themselves. They develop through centrifugal principles, 
from the inside out. Their coupled processes result in the self-organized emergence of the 
behavioral patterns that direct the system towards homeostasis. What would we say about 
systems like these? Perhaps we would not say they were alive, but would they have an 
Umwelt? Emmeche, for one, gives the following answer: 
“If such a material device as a robot could have that special organic flexibility of an animal that 
allows it to instantiate anything like the law of mind, that is, the tendency to let signs influence or 
affiliate with other signs in a self-organizing manner, it is difficult to see why such devices should 
not be able to realize genuine signs (including qualisigns). (…) If that artificially constructed 
system realizes qualisign action and living feeling, it would have mind in Peirce’s sense. But 
would it have an Umwelt? Is there anybody home in there, experiencing something?” (Emmeche 
2001: 21). 
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There seems to be something slightly unjust in repeating the question after granting 
so much. When there is ‘qualisign action’ and ‘living feeling’ it would seem, there is an 
Umwelt. At some point the perennial question should be stopped, if it is to mean more 
than the a repetition of the ‘other minds’ problem. At the same time, one can, perhaps, 
sympathize with the reluctance to ascribe full-blown form of experience to a simple robot. 
Maybe we can avoid repeating the perennial question of AI in this situation by consi-
dering an intermediate stage on the road to a complete Umwelt. Lucia Santaella, during 
this workshop, spoke of ‘rudimentary organisms’ like plants and rivers. Perhaps, it would 
be useful to consider whether robots could qualify as some kind of rudimentary organism 
having something that perhaps might be called a ‘proto-Umwelt’. Interestingly, biologists 
sometimes speak about cells in a way that comes close to this. Emmeche, for instance 
speaks about protozoa: 
“which lack a nervous system and a genuine Umwelt, but do (..) have a simpler ‘autokinetic or 
self-moving circle’ by which they enter into semiotic interactions with their exterior milieu.” 
(Emmeche 2001: 18). 
Kaufmann discusses the semiotic capacities of bacteria and notices a similar ‘half-
way’ possibility:  
“A bacterium knows how to make a living in its world, but no consciousness needs to be attrib-
uted. The know-how is the propagating organization. Once there is an autonomous agent, there is 
a semantics from its privileged point of view. The incoming molecule is yuck or yum. Once yuck 
and yum, we are not far from Peirce’s meaning laded semiotic triad: sign, signified, significans.” 
(Kaufmann 2000: 111; also 113). 
Finally, the neurophysiologist Damasio (1999: 136-137) indicates that for instance 
amoeba can be seen as possessing ‘some biological antecedents of the sense of self’. 
Thus, there is acknowledgment of a form of autokinesis that does lead to something close 
to semiotic capacities and a sense of self without creating an Umwelt in the full sense of 
the word. Once we accept this possibility, it becomes hard to see why self-organizing, 
homeostatic artificial systems that consist of autopoietic units engaging in simple autoki-
nesis and semiotic interaction with their environment would not have at least a ‘proto-
Umwelt’ of the kind that is granted to unicellular creatures. Why not attribute such non-
living creatures the same kind of ‘proto-Umwelt’ as biologists do to cells?  
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